

Summary: Intervention & Options

Department /Agency: Home Office	Title: Impact Assessment of Local Accountability options for Policing Green Paper	
Stage:	Version: 1.4	Date: 23/05/08
Related Publications:		

Available to view or download at:

<http://www.>

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What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?

There is currently a democratic deficit in policing governance as people have no directly elected person with influence over their local police nor are there sufficient mechanisms for local people to input and influence policing priorities. Increasing democratic accountability is a good thing in its own right and will also help us meet our objective to lead visible, responsive and accountable policing. There is also some evidence that it will drive greater confidence and satisfaction with the police leading to people feeling safer in their homes and communities.

What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?

- A customer service culture is encouraged, meaning people feel satisfied with the standard of service they receive when they come into contact (or try to come into contact) with the police.
- People feel that the police respond to the policing and community safety issues of most concern in their area and that, as a result, crime and anti-social behaviour is reduced.
- The police answer to the local community for the service they provide and the results they deliver.
- There is a visible and effective mechanism that holds the police to account for the service they provide locally.

What policy options have been considered? Please justify any preferred option.

1. Do nothing
2. Introduce a "Policing Pledge". We favour taking forward this option. The "Policing Pledge" needs to be backed up by effective accountability structures. We looked at three options to achieve this. They were:
3. Appoint a local councillor or mayor as chair of the CDRP
4. Directly elect a chair for the CDRP
5. Directly elect a person to both chair the CDRP and sit on the police authority
Of these, we favour taking forward option 5.
6. Create a Community Safety Fund for the directly elected representative to use to drive partnership working to deliver local people's ppriorities. We favour taking forward this option.

When will the policy be reviewed to establish the actual costs and benefits and the achievement of the desired effects? A full review will be undertaken within two years of the introduction of Crime and Policing Representatives and, in any case, before elections for their second term.

Ministerial Sign-off For SELECT STAGE Impact Assessments:

I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.

Signed by the responsible Minister:

..... Date:

Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option: 2

Description: Introduction of a 'Policing Pledge'

COSTS	ANNUAL COSTS		Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups'
	One-off (Transition)	Yrs	
	£ 300,000		Cost to the Department of the development and printing of 'Pledge cards' or other means of communicating the Pledge.
	Average Annual Cost (excluding one-off)		The content will be cost neutral to police forces if <u>only</u> limited to what is currently being delivered.
£ 0			
		Total Cost (PV)	£ 300,000
<p>Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Neighbourhood Police Teams will be responsible for agreeing priorities following engagement with the local community and compiling, publishing and distributing the Pledge document. CDRPs and police authorities will performance manage the police against the guarantees.</p>			

BENEFITS	ANNUAL BENEFITS		Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'
	One-off	Yrs	
	£		
	Average Annual Benefit (excluding one-off)		
£			
		Total Benefit (PV)	£
<p>Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups' Benefits to the public from a national standard on what people can expect from the police, underpinned in each area by a set of local priorities, agreed by people in each neighbourhood.</p> <p>Expected benefit in public confidence levels, contributing to the delivery of PSA 23.</p>			

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks A number of questions still need to be resolved, including:

- Will the Pledge go further than the police currently guarantee? If so this will have to be costed.
- How will the Pledge be performance managed?
- What form of redress is there if the Pledge is not met?

Price Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit Range (NPV) £ 0	NET BENEFIT (NPV Best estimate) £ - 0.3m	
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What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?				England & Wales	
On what date will the policy be implemented?				2008	
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?				HMIC	
What is the total annual cost of enforcement for these organisations?				£ TBD	
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?				N/A	
Will implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?				N/A	
What is the value of the proposed offsetting measure per year?				£	
What is the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions?				£	
Will the proposal have a significant impact on competition?				Yes/No	
Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)		Micro	Small	Medium	Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?		Yes/No	Yes/No	N/A	N/A

Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)				(Increase - Decrease)	
Increase of	£	Decrease of	£	Net Impact	£

Key:	Annual costs and benefits: Constant Prices	(Net) Present Value
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Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option: 3

Description: Appoint a local councillor or mayor to chair the CDRP to hold BCU Commanders to account

COSTS	ANNUAL COSTS		Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Annual cost covers paying a Special Responsibility Allowance to councillors for the additional role of chairing the CDRP. Assumes additional £5,000pa allowance for each of 373 CDRP chairs over a 4 year cycle beginning 2010.
	One-off (Transition)	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Cost (excluding one-off)		
	£ 1,865,000	4	Total Cost (PV) £ 6,619,000
Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups'			

BENEFITS	ANNUAL BENEFITS		Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'
	One-off	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Benefit (excluding one-off)		
	£ 0		Total Benefit (PV) £ 0
Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups' The public will benefit from having a named, visible individual to approach who will facilitate delivery at the local level, helping to improve local confidence and satisfaction levels in the police and reduce crime and disorder and perceptions of crime and disorder.			

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks The model does not introduce direct, democratic accountability. CDRPs and BCUs are not co-terminous in some areas. There will be a tension between the chair of the CDRP holding the BCU Commander to account as well as the Chief Constable. Crime and policing issues could be deprioritised by busy councillors.

Price Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit Range (NPV) £	NET BENEFIT (NPV Best estimate) £
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What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?		England & Wales	
On what date will the policy be implemented?		2010	
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?			
What is the total annual cost of enforcement for these organisations?		£	
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?		N/A	
Will implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?		N/A	
What is the value of the proposed offsetting measure per year?		£	
What is the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions?		£	
Will the proposal have a significant impact on competition?		N/A	
Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)	Micro	Small	Medium Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?	Yes/No	Yes/No	N/A N/A

Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)		(Increase - Decrease)	
Increase of £	Decrease of £	Net Impact	£

Key:	Annual costs and benefits: Constant Prices	(Net) Present Value
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Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option: 4

Description: Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP

COSTS	ANNUAL COSTS		Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Transition cost is for a combined election in 2010 with a four-year term of office. More regular elections would result in greater costs over a 4 year cycle. Average annual cost includes provision for by-elections and an allowance of £15,000 per annum for each representative, in line with local councillors, over four years from 2010.
	One-off (Transition)	Yrs	
	£ 18,130,000		
	Average Annual Cost (excluding one-off)		
	£ 6,095,000	4	Total Cost (PV) £ 38,555,000
Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Any costs of training required for directly elected CDRP chairs			

BENEFITS	ANNUAL BENEFITS		Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'
	One-off	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Benefit (excluding one-off)		
	£ 0		Total Benefit (PV) £ 0
Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups' The public will benefit from having a named, visible individual to approach who will facilitate delivery at the local level, helping to improve local confidence and satisfaction levels in the police and reduce crime and disorder and perceptions of crime and disorder. Being directly elected would ensure focus.			

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks CDRPs and BCUs are not co-terminous in some areas. There will be a tension between the chair of the CDRP holding the BCU Commander to account as well as the Chief Constable. Crime and policing issues could be deprioritised by busy councillors.

Price Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit Range (NPV) £	NET BENEFIT (NPV Best estimate) £ -38.6m
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What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?	England & Wales			
On what date will the policy be implemented?	2010			
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?				
What is the total annual cost of enforcement for these organisations?	£			
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?	N/A			
Will implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?	N/A			
What is the value of the proposed offsetting measure per year?	£			
What is the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions?	£			
Will the proposal have a significant impact on competition?	N/A			
Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)	Micro	Small	Medium	Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?	Yes/No	Yes/No	N/A	N/A

Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)		(Increase - Decrease)	
Increase of £	Decrease of £	Net Impact	£

Key: Annual costs and benefits: Constant Prices (Net) Present Value

Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option: 5

Description: Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP and sit on the police authority

COSTS	ANNUAL COSTS		Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Transition cost is for a combined election in 2010 with a four-year term of office. More regular elections would result in greater costs over a 4 year cycle. Average annual cost includes provision for by-elections and an allowance of £15,000 per annum for each representative, in line with local councillors, over four years from 2010.
	One-off (Transition)	Yrs	
	£ 18,130,000		
	Average Annual Cost (excluding one-off)		
	£ 6,095,000	4	Total Cost (PV) £ 38,555,000
Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Any costs of training required for directly elected CDRP chairs			

BENEFITS	ANNUAL BENEFITS		Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'
	One-off	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Benefit (excluding one-off)		
	£ 0	4	Total Benefit (PV) £ 0
Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups' Benefits as option 4 plus additional benefit of link between operational and strategic level and ability to hold Chief Constable to account for local policing.			

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks

Price Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit Range (NPV) £	NET BENEFIT (NPV Best estimate) £ -38.6m
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What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?	England & Wales			
On what date will the policy be implemented?	2010			
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?				
What is the total annual cost of enforcement for these organisations?	£			
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?	N/A			
Will implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?	N/A			
What is the value of the proposed offsetting measure per year?	£			
What is the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions?	£			
Will the proposal have a significant impact on competition?	N/A			
Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)	Micro	Small	Medium	Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?	Yes/No	Yes/No	N/A	N/A

Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)			(Increase - Decrease)		
Increase of	£	Decrease of	£	Net Impact	£

Key: Annual costs and benefits: Constant Prices (Net) Present Value

Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option: 6 a, b, c

Description: Create a Community Safety Fund

COSTS	ANNUAL COSTS		Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups' There are no monetised costs associated with this option.
	One-off (Transition)	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Cost (excluding one-off)		
	£ 0		Total Cost (PV) £ 0
Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups' Some distributional implications from raising additional taxation or diverting existing funding. These will depend on where the burden of any additional tax falls.			

BENEFITS	ANNUAL BENEFITS		Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'
	One-off	Yrs	
	£ 0		
	Average Annual Benefit (excluding one-off)		
	£ 0		Total Benefit (PV) £ 0
Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups' Funding will be targeted on locally prioritised problems. This would help build confidence in and satisfaction in the police and reduce crime and social disorder and perceptions of crime and disorder.			

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks Additional council tax is likely to be an unpopular option.

Price Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit Range (NPV) £	NET BENEFIT (NPV Best estimate) £ 0
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What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?	England & Wales			
On what date will the policy be implemented?	2010			
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?				
What is the total annual cost of enforcement for these organisations?	£			
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?	N/A			
Will implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?	N/A			
What is the value of the proposed offsetting measure per year?	£			
What is the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions?	£			
Will the proposal have a significant impact on competition?	N/A			
Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)	Micro	Small	Medium	Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?	Yes/No	Yes/No	N/A	N/A

Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)		(Increase - Decrease)	
Increase of £	Decrease of £	Net Impact	£

Key:	Annual costs and benefits: Constant Prices	(Net) Present Value
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Evidence Base (for summary sheets)

[Use this space (with a recommended maximum of 30 pages) to set out the evidence, analysis and detailed narrative from which you have generated your policy options or proposal. Ensure that the information is organised in such a way as to explain clearly the summary information on the preceding pages of this form.]

What is the problem?

- Police authorities do not have sufficient democratic accountability
- Police authorities do not have the teeth to hold the police to account for delivering local priorities and therefore do not do this sufficiently
- Current structures are not sufficiently driving public confidence in the police

What is causing the problem?

Police authorities currently have a membership of around 17 people, 9 councillors elected to an upper tier council and appointed by the council to reflect the political balance of the parties, 5 independent members appointed by the councillors and 3 magistrates appointed by the other members of the police authority. No members are directly elected to sit on the police authority.

The New Local Government Network report found that the police are not properly held to account as police authorities lack the teeth to do this. The Oxford Policing Policy Forum (2006) reported that the tripartite structure is out dated and is not effective at holding the police to account and is not sufficiently transparent.

Focus groups commissioned by the Flanagan Review in November 2007 found that the public were generally not aware that police authorities existed and of those that were, not all knew their role. This indicates that police authorities are not engaging fully with the public and that therefore they are not ensuring that the public's priorities are being fed into policing plans.

Although Neighbourhood Policing Teams have a duty to consult with members of the public on their concerns, there is no systematic way for local people to impact on prioritisation of crime and disorder issues in their area. Many people feel they have little say in decisions made about policing;

Public confidence in local police has risen over recent years, currently standing at 51% (BCS), and could be further improved. Satisfaction with the police following contact is stable at between 58% and 60%, although this is 10 percentage points lower than in 1994 (BCS). In addition, 42% of people questioned felt crime levels in their areas were increasing (BCS)

The current accountability arrangements for the police are seen to contribute to confidence and satisfaction levels:

- It is unclear whether Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships work effectively in all areas to tackle the crime and disorder issues which are of concern to the public;
- There are no coherent service standards setting out the level of service citizens are entitled to expect from their police force;
- There is no champion at a local, operational level to whom local people can refer when they are not satisfied with the service offered;
- Police authorities are not directly accountable to the public which they represent and are poor at engaging with the communities they serve.

Evidence to support the nature and scale of the problem

Sir Ronnie Flanagan recognised in his Review of Policing that, “an increase in local accountability will only generate an increase in public confidence if the roles of government, police and accountability bodies are understood; if people feel they have an opportunity to comment and influence what happens locally; and if the police are enabled to deliver improved performance; and if those charged with scrutiny and accountability ensure that they do”.

Research shows that 57% of the public feel they have no influence over the police and little say in decisions about policing. There is also a lack of knowledge of who to contact. (Wood & MacAlister (2005) *Accountable – Responsive and Independent on the Need for Balance In Police Governance*. *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, Vol 7 No3, 2005, pp197-207)

Recent evaluations have suggested that, where communities are engaged in setting local priorities which are then addressed through a problem-solving, partnership approach, there is a corresponding increase in the level of public confidence in the local police. (Myhill 2003 *Community Engagement in Policing: Lessons from the Literature* (London, Home Office). The evaluation of the impact of Neighbourhood Policing, which emphasises community participation in the identification and prioritisation of problems at the local level, alongside higher police visibility and a problem-solving approach, found that confidence in the police was greatly improved in the pathfinder areas where this approach was taken. Tuffin et al 2006 *An Evaluation of the Impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme*) However, it is not possible to isolate the specific impact of public engagement from the other elements of the model and, therefore, difficult to quantify the effect of this specific principle. Further research has demonstrated there may be an effect on perceptions of crime and social disorder where it is felt that local police are tackling issues which matter to local people. (NPIA analysis of BCS - Myhill & Beak 2008 *Public Confidence in the police* Unpublished)

Reform of CDRPs to enable them to tackle issues of concern to the public is underway, yet feedback from the Neighbourhood Policing Programme Team suggests that new engagement practices have yet to develop and CDRPs are continuing to rely on the existing practices of partners.

Consultation undertaken by Sir Ronnie Flanagan to inform his review found that police authorities have a low public profile. The review recommended that, “robust scrutiny and challenge from police authorities should be an.....important mechanism for relaying the views of the public to a force about priorities” through consultation. This is supported by robust case study research, which also found that, when people knew more about the role and remit of police authorities, people thought they were helpful, although there was some scepticism. (Myhill et al 2006 – *The future role of police authorities in public engagement*, London, Home Office)

Home Office research suggests that performance of police authorities is increasingly varied and progress toward public accountability at the strategic level is patchy. (Myhill, 2003, *The role of police authorities in public engagement*, London, Home Office). There is a similar pattern among service providers in other policy areas. However, case study evidence highlights that police authorities can enhance community engagement at the neighbourhood level by playing an enabling and monitoring role. (Myhill et al 2006 – *The future role of police authorities in community engagement: Learning from three demonstration projects*. London, HO/APA). In his recent review of policing, Sir Ronnie Flanagan found that the accountability of policing is crucial to democratic legitimacy as it involves the use of force. However, he found that current accountability mechanisms for ensuring the police deliver for citizens are weak. (Flanagan Review)

Policy options

The policy options for a new local accountability model encompass six main proposals:

1. Do nothing
2. Introduce a 'Policing Pledge' in which local police forces publish their priorities and set service standards
3. Appoint an existing local councillor or mayor to chair the CDRP
4. Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP
5. Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP **and** sit on the police authority
6. Create a Community Safety Fund for CDRPs to use in addressing local concerns

The Home Office will complete a new burdens assessment, as required under the collectively agreed new burdens rules.

1. Do nothing

The existing arrangements could be left as they are. Neighbourhood Policing Teams would still have a duty to demonstrate they had consulted with local people when setting priorities but without setting standards for service delivery. CDRP make-up would remain as at present. Police authorities would continue to comprise a mixture of local councillors and independent members, with people dissatisfied with the service offered by local police referring their concerns to either a police authority member or directly to the police authority.

This option fails to address the concerns already outlined, including increasing the democratic accountability of the police, meaning that more effective and transparent accountability arrangements will not be delivered and the outcomes of improved confidence in the police and a reduction in levels of crime and disorder will not be delivered. Although research by the NPIA has concluded it is likely that existing Neighbourhood Policing policies will drive improved satisfaction and confidence in the police, implementation failure is a significant risk. Consequently, a policy to drive greater engagement with the public around service standards and mechanisms for the public to influence policing which builds on the neighbourhood policing approach and drives successful implementation would be worth considering.

Costs

As no changes will be required to existing systems and structures, there will be no change in costs.

2. Introduce a 'Policing Pledge' in which local police forces publish their priorities and set service standards

The primary means to communicating to the public what they can expect from the police will be the new Policing Pledge, to be published by the end of 2008. The new Policing Pledge will, for the first time, set clear, public facing service standards for the police from first contact through to follow up. It will also (through the local element) give the public a way to hold neighbourhood policing teams to account for tackling their local priorities. This will work in conjunction with more regular and local crime information which will be rolled-out in July 2008, providing people with evidence to inform their engagement with, and evaluation of the performance of, the police in their area. The issues highlighted would then be prioritised for action by the police, in conjunction with local partners.

It is proposed that the Pledge will contain both a national and local section. The national part will be consistent for all forces but the local will contain standard elements that vary from area

to area depending on local provision/priorities. An example of what the Pledge might look like is set out at Annex B.

Benefits

As has already been outlined, there is strong evidence of improvements in confidence levels in the local police where the community has been engaged in setting local priorities, with the suggestion that perceptions of crime and social disorder also improve where it is felt the police are actively tackling local concerns. By setting out in the Pledge what the locally agreed priorities are and the standards that the police will meet in addressing them, there should be a measurable improvement in levels of public confidence and satisfaction.

Costs

There will also be some cost associated with the development and printing of 'Pledge cards' or other means of communicating the Pledge. This has been estimated at between **£200,000 - £300,000**. The specific content of the Pledge is still to be finalised. However, the bulk of the content is likely to reflect existing commitments by the police and should therefore be cost neutral. The exception to this will be any commitment the Pledge makes on updating witnesses during an investigation but as this would reflect the forthcoming Witness Charter this is out of scope for this IA.

3. Appoint a local councillor or mayor to chair the CDRP to hold BCU Commanders to account

The existing CDRP structure would be retained, with a local councillor or, in areas which have them, a mayor as chair. In the event of a member of the public being dissatisfied with a particular issue, they would be able to approach the chair of the CDRP to ask them to take action on their behalf. Through the partnership mechanism, the elected member would be able to hold the local BCU Commander to account, thereby ensuring that neighbourhood police are addressing local concerns. Police authority make-up would remain unchanged.

Benefits

Having a named individual would increase visibility of the work of CDRPs to the public and act as an incentive to BCU Commanders to facilitate delivery at the local level to tackle public concerns and provide a good quality of service. The fact that the chair will be directly accountable to the public would allow citizens a greater say in how local policing is delivered and ensure that the police and CDRP are working effectively within the framework of the partnership. This would aid the improvement in confidence and satisfaction levels, while incidents of crime and social disorder which concern local people will reduce through the greater focus on prioritisation.

However, there are certain problems with adopting this model.

The model would not address the need to introduce a transparent, democratic accountability mechanism into policing. In addition, a number of CDRP areas are not co-terminous with BCU areas. This could cause difficulty, as some BCU Commanders may be held to account by a number of CDRPs, increasing constraints on their time. It will also create a tension, as BCU Commanders will become directly accountable to the Board chair for local, operational matters, while remaining accountable to the Chief Constable for force-wide strategic issues.

Local councillors or mayors would also have a wider remit than purely crime and policing issues, which could cause confusion among members of the public over who to approach. It

may also lead to crime and policing issues being deprioritised in favour of other local government matters by the councillor.

Costs

Costs would be fairly low as the existing CDRP structure would be retained. The chair may be entitled to a Special Responsibility Allowance as recognition of their role in chairing the CDRP, although Local Authorities are responsible for setting the levels of such allowances. Assuming that the allowance will be approximately £5,000 per year, as there are currently 373 CDRPs in England and Wales, this would equate to a total of **£7.48m per annum**.

A breakdown of costs is at Annex A, although as this option does not fully meet the policy objectives, detailed costs for additional training, allowances and expenses have not been fully explored.

4. Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP

Elections would be held allowing local people to choose the chair of their CDRP.

Directly electing a chair for the Local Crime Board would necessitate an election process, which could be either independently on a standalone basis or combined with an existing local government election. A standalone election would ensure there is greater clarity over the role of Board chair and would allow the flexibility to run elections to suite the timetable of the Board, but electorate turnout may be low. Chairs would also expect to receive an allowance or salary.

Benefits

The benefits of this model are similar to those for option 3, as the chair would have a remit to facilitate partnership working and ensure the BCU is delivering against its promises for the benefit of the people they represent. However, directly electing a chair would ensure clarity to the public over the role they are electing someone to fill. Doing so would raise the profile of CDRPs and, unlike councillors, the directly-elected representative would have a small portfolio, ensuring a focus on local crime and policing issues. This would further aid the improvement in confidence and satisfaction levels, while incidents of crime and social disorder which concern local people will reduce through the greater focus on prioritisation.

However, as with option 3, this model does not address the lack of co-terminosity of many CDRPs with BCUs and the problems and additional costs that addressing this issue would have.

Costs

Directly electing a chair for the CDRP would necessitate an election process, which could be either independently on a standalone basis or combined with an existing local government election. A standalone election would ensure there is greater clarity over the role of Board chair and would allow the flexibility to run elections to suite the timetable of the Board, but electorate turnout may be low.

Combined elections, where the election of a CDRP chair could be tied in with an existing local government election, are more cost-effective. Candidates would benefit from the added momentum surrounding local elections and from the turnout that may be secured by interest in the other ballots, although we would need to ensure electors were not presented with an unmanageable number of ballot papers.

Chairs would also expect to receive an allowance or salary and may incur additional costs through the employment of administrative staff and the cost of setting up and running an office.

Overall costs will vary depending on the type of elections held and their frequency, along with whether the directly-elected representative receives an allowance or a pensionable salary.

A breakdown of the cost options is at Annex A.

5. Directly elect a representative to chair the CDRP and sit on the police authority

Local people in each CDRP area (with some exceptions¹) would directly elect a Crime and Policing Representative. This person would be a visible, accessible point of contact to whom the public can refer issues of concern. The representative would chair the CDRP, providing a voice for local citizens in decisions on spending and local priorities.

The Crime and Policing Representative would also sit on the police authority, where they would join other democratically-elected representatives from the police authority area, replacing the majority of current local government representatives. A small number of local government representatives would retain membership, as well as a number of independent members. The Crime and Policing Representatives would form the majority.

Benefits

The fact that the chair of the CDRP will be directly accountable to the public will allow citizens a greater say in how local policing is delivered, as with option 4. It will also act as an incentive to ensure a better service is provided for the citizen. The additional responsibility for membership of the police authority will also ensure that chief constables take the views of the public seriously and hold BCU Commanders to account accordingly.

The crime and policing representative could decide whether issues raised by the public could best be dealt with by the Neighbourhood Policing Team, through the partnership structures of the CDRP or, if they felt there was a serious systemic problem, they could raise it at the police authority. Membership of both bodies would mean that operational matters can be dealt with in the context of wider, more strategic decision-making, without becoming parochial.

Local people will be able, through their directly, democratically elected representative, to hold their chief constable to account if he or she is not delivering the police service local people want. This will provide an incentive for the chief constable to ensure, through the relevant BCU commanders, that neighbourhood police are delivering the priorities and service standards set out in the Policing Pledge. By sitting on the police authority, the crime and policing representative will also give local people a powerful voice on the strategic decision-making body.

The prospect of using an existing local councillor to chair the CDRP and sit on the police authority was also considered. However, it was felt that, for the reasons outlined under option 3, the policy objectives sought would not be met by this solution.

Costs

Costs will be incurred through the election of representatives and in paying them either an allowance or salary, along with expenses to enable them to carry out their duties, as with

¹ Where having a crime and policing representative from every CDRP in a policing area would make the police authority overly large, one representative could cover two areas. This is an issue in relatively few areas.

option 4. However, as this option includes the representative sitting on the police authority, the time commitment is likely to be greater than for option 4, and so a competitive package should be offered to ensure the role attracts the right calibre of candidate.

A breakdown of cost options is at Annex A.

6. Create a Community Safety Fund

The chair of the CDRP or Local Crime Board would control a small pot of money, held by the police authority, which could be used to fund projects connected with community safety in accordance with the locally determined priorities. The spending of this pot of money would be collectively determined by the partnership, with the possibility of participatory budgeting.

Benefits

Introducing a new fund will create additional funding for community safety, with the use of the money being determined locally. It would act as an effective lever to facilitate partnership working and problem-solving based on the priorities agreed with the local community. Additional funding to facilitate these projects will lead to an improvement in delivered outcomes, with a resulting increase in public confidence in and satisfaction with the police and a reduction in crime and disorder.

Costs

The Community Safety Fund could be paid for in three different ways; an additional precept on council tax; top-slicing the existing police precept; or by using an existing grant, such as the BCU fund.

6.a) An additional precept on council tax

This would require council tax payers to pay a charge in addition to the existing police precept. As the existing mechanisms for collecting and distributing the money are already in place, there are no implications for additional cost. This would, of course, mean higher council tax bills for the public.

6.b) A top slice from the existing police precept

Minimal additional costs will be incurred by top-slicing the police precept, as the structures are already in place to assess, collect and handle this money at police authority level.

However, if police authorities were not to suffer a loss in their general income, the Government would need to provide additional funding to make up the money which has been top-sliced.

6.c) Using an existing grant such as the BCU fund

Grants such as the BCU grant exist to fund local initiatives and support partnership working on community safety projects. The BCU grant is currently delegated to the BCU commander by the Chief Constable to spend on local priorities determined by the CDRP. This fund could instead be placed in the hands of the elected police authority member to be used to support locally determined priorities.

Specific Impact Tests: Checklist

We have carefully considered the related impacts of this specific proposal and have concluded that it will not affect the private sector nor will it raise any issues around the other impacts listed. An Equality Impact Assessment has been produced for the Green Paper which can be seen at [\[link/page\]](#). We have considered whether a Privacy Impact Assessment was necessary and decided it was not.

Type of testing undertaken	<i>Results in Evidence Base?</i>	<i>Results annexed?</i>
Competition Assessment	No	No
Small Firms Impact Test	No	No
Legal Aid	No	No
Sustainable Development	No	No
Carbon Assessment	No	No
Other Environment	No	No
Health Impact Assessment	No	No
Race Equality	No	No
Disability Equality	No	No
Gender Equality	No	No
Human Rights	No	No
Rural Proofing	No	No

Annexes

Annex A – Local Accountability Costs

3. Existing local councillor or mayor as chair of CDRP

Existing local government representatives would, most likely, be offered a 'Special Responsibility Allowance' to chair the CDRP.

Special Responsibility Allowance	£5k per annum
Total for 373 Local Crime Boards	£1.87m per annum
Total for 373 LCBs over 4 years	£7.48m

4. & 5. Directly elected representatives

Directly electing a representative would necessitate an election process, which could be either independently on a standalone basis or combined with an existing local government election. A standalone election would ensure there is greater clarity over the role and would allow the flexibility to run elections to suite the timetable of the CDRP/police authority, but electorate turnout may be low.

Local election costs vary, although the cost of running a General Election provides a good proxy. The cost of the running the 2005 General Election was £80m. However, candidates would not have access to a free postage facility, reducing this figure by £25m. As elections would only take place in England and Wales, the cost would further reduced by £5m. (from MoJ)

Costs for a standalone election

Cost of last General Election	£80m
No provision for free postage facility	-£25m
Only applicable to England and Wales	-£5m
Total	£50m

These costs would be incurred on each occasion that there was an all-out election for directly-elected representatives and the frequency would depend on the term of office. Provision would also need to be made to fund by-elections in the event of a resignation, retirement or death. Turnover of local councillors during 2007 was somewhere between 1 and 2%.² If the decision were taken to pay a salary, rather than the allowance paid to councillors, it is likely that the rate of turnover should be at the lower end of this scale, as it would be less tempting to move on to better-paid, more secure positions elsewhere. Assuming a turnover rate of 1% every year, this would equate to £500k per annum.

Costs for a standalone election over a 4 year period

Standalone election	£50m
Provision for by-elections	£2m
Total for 4 year period	£52m

Running a **combined election**, tying in with council elections, would, however, be more cost effective, although total costs over time will depend on the term of office.

Simply adding an additional ballot paper to an existing local election will not be cost-free as provision must be made for handling the additional complexity, including counting ballot papers. Furthermore, not every part of England and Wales holds local elections every two years so in some areas the elections would have to be standalone.

A combined election costs approximately 15% more to run than a non-combined election.³ If elections were held **every two years** and coincided with the point where local elections covered approximately 50% of the electorate in England and Wales, meaning half of the polls could be combined and half would be standalone, the total cost every two years would be £28.75m.

In addition, provision would need to be made for by-elections at the rate of £500k per annum.

Costs for a combined election with a 2 year term of office

Standalone election (covering 50% of England & Wales)	£25m
Additional cost of combined election (covering 50% of England & Wales)	£3.75m
Provision for by-elections	£1m
Total for 2 year period	£29.75m
Total for 4 year period	£59.5m

If the term of office were **four years**, elections could be combined with the point in the local election cycle when the highest proportion of electors in England and Wales were already going to vote. If 75% of the population already had elections, the cost every four years would be £18.13m, as a standalone election would still be necessary for the remaining 25% of the electorate.

In addition, provision would need to be made for by-elections at £500k per annum.

Costs for a combined election with a 4 year term of office

Standalone election (covering 25% of England & Wales)	£12.5m
Additional cost of combined election (covering 75% of England & Wales)	£5.63m
Provision for by-elections	£2m
Total for 4 year period	£20.13m

The role of the directly-elected representative should also attract some form of remuneration, either as an **allowance** or payment of a full **salary**. A sliding scale may be necessary as some may have more responsibility and demands on their time than others. They will also incur additional expenses if they need to employ administrative staff and set up and run an office.

In line with other local government representatives, such as district councillors, Board representatives could be paid an allowance for their services, perhaps alongside a 'Special Responsibility Allowance' for the additional duties undertaken in chairing the CDRP. There would be no right to receive a pension. Allowances for councillors are currently determined by the local authority, making comparison difficult. However, assuming an allowance of £10,000, with a Special Responsibility Allowance of around £5,000, the costs are likely to be as follows:

Costs for allowances

Allowance	£10k per annum
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Special Responsibility Allowance	£5k per annum
Total	£15k per annum
Total for 373 CDRPs	£5.6m per annum
Total for 4 year period	£22.38m

However, paying only an allowance is unlikely to attract the high calibre of candidate required for this role and may also, as in many local councils, lead to a high turnover as chairs move on to better-paid positions.

Another option would be to offer a competitive salary which recognises the time commitment expected and which will attract people with the necessary skills to carry out the role. This could work on a 'sliding scale' which could be dependent on the number of constituents the directly-elected official represents or levels of crime and disorder within the CDRP area.

Costs for salary if part-time

Salary	£25k per annum
Pension/NIC	£10k per annum
Total	£35k per annum
Total for 373 CDRPs	£12.95m per annum
Total for 4 year period	£51.8m

Costs for salary if full-time

Salary	£50k per annum
Pension/NIC	£20k per annum
Total	£70k per annum
Total for 373 CDRPs	£25.9m per annum
Total for 4 year period	£103.6m

Directly elected Board chairs may need to employ a small number of staff to manage their office, diaries and correspondence.

They may also require office space from which to operate, along with the necessary IT and telecommunications, to ensure accessibility and a connection with the local area.

Working on the assumption that each representative will require around £50k per annum to run their office if they are part-time, rising to £100k per annum if they are full-time, the costs will be as follows:

Expenses for running office if part-time

Expenses	£50k per annum
Total for 373 CDRPs	£18.65m per annum
Total for 4 year period	£74.6m

Expenses for running office if full-time

Expenses	£100k per annum
Total for 373 CDRPs	£37.3m per annum
Total for 4 year period	£149.2m

As directly-elected representatives could come from any walk of life, they are likely to need training to ensure they are able to lead the CDRP effectively, interact with members of the

public and manage a budget. CLG currently runs such programmes for local councillors, which cost approximately 3.3m per annum, although, owing to the numbers involved, costs for training directly-elected representatives are likely to be much lower.

Annex B - Draft Policing Pledge

Nationally, the police service in England and Wales will:

- ✓ Always treat you fairly and with respect and will ensure that you have fair access to our service
- ✓ Aim to answer 999 calls within 10 seconds and non-emergency within 30 seconds and tell you how your call will be handled
- ✓ Respond appropriately to incidents and tell you how we will deal with them
- ✓ Ensure there is a visible policing team in for your neighbourhood with named contacts
- ✓ Establish what the local issues and problems in your area are and work with the local council and others to tackle them
- ✓ Provide you with monthly updates about crime in your area and how your local force is performing
- ✓ If you are a victim keep you informed monthly of progress on your case
- ✓ Always listen and respond appropriately to complaints

The local neighbourhood policing team for your area is:

[photos]

Sergeant Martin Selway, PC Adam Gordon, PC Ian Willis, PCSO Adam Clarke, PCSO Simon Turpin and PCSO Chris Jackson.

Each member of this team will be familiar with the area and should serve at least two years dedicated to solving your neighbourhood problems. The team work in co-operation with Neighbourhood Manager Alison Kay-Porter.

They can be contacted by phone (xxxx xxxxxxxx) and e-mail (xxxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxxxx.co.uk) and hold monthly public meetings at the Community centre, Xxxxxxxx Road on the second Saturday of every month at 6pm.

If you contact us and leave a voicemail or send an e-mail we will get back to you at the latest within 48hrs. If you have an emergency please call 999. If you have a non-neighbourhood issue that requires police attention but is not an emergency please call the 24hour non-emergency force centre on xxx xxxxxxxx.

Your locally agreed priorities are:

1. Street level drug dealing around the xxxxxxxx Road area
2. Youth related anti-social behaviour the shopping centre
3. Fly tipping on the common

Every month the website will update progress on tackling these priorities and more detail will be provided by a quarterly newsletter delivered to each household.